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I. INTRODUCTION

Tax law may be the most complex area of the law, since it regulates and permeates an expansive range of relationships, both between one person and another and between each person and the
state. International taxation is balanced with yet another layer of

complexity because it involves the often conflicting assertion of
the states of their right to tax a maximum amount of economic

activity. Within this rarified field of international taxation exists
an even smaller subset of law which is so internally complex that
it makes other tax law topics look like bedtime reading-the law
governing Domestic International Sales Corporations, called
"DISCs." The bulk of this law is codified in Internal Revenue
Code sections 991-9971 and their interpretive Treasury Regulations.2 Originally passed in 1971,' DISC legislation enabled domestic producers to defer almost indefinitely the tax on a large
1. All references to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) will be to the Code of
1954, as amended through April 2, 1981, unless otherwise indicated.
2. See also Proposed Amendments to Regs. §§ 1.861-3, 1.993-3, 1.993-4,
1.995-4, 1.995-5, 1.996-1, 1.996-3, 46 Fed. Reg. 116-20 (Jan. 2, 1981).
3. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 501-507, 85 Stat. 497
(1971)(prior to 1976 amendment).
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portion of their export income through a new type of corporate
entity, created exclusively for tax purposes.
But why? This Note examines the logical and empirical validity
of the reasons for the passage of the DISC legislation. Basically,
the DISC legislation was prompted by the negative trade balance
in 1971, a novel phenomenon in post-World 'War H United
States.' Providing a tax break on producers' export income was
viewed as a way of reducing trade deficits by stimulating exports.
On its surface, using "tax expenditures" to reach this goal seems

logical, or at least benign. But when one considers that the primary thrust of the legislation was to encourage small producers to

enter the export market, 5 the logic of using a statutory plan that
is convoluted at best and baroque at worst is seriously flawed.'

After reviewing the legislative history of DISCs, this Note examines the basic mechanics of setting up and operating them.
Next, selected aspects of the inner workings of these special cor-

4.

In 1971,

. .

. there was a trade deficit of $2.7 billion, the first trade

deficit incurred by the United States since 1888. This fact was known to
Congress when the DISC legislation was passed in December 1971. In
1972, the first year DISC was in effect, exports from the United States
made their largest increase ever in dollar terms, rising by over seven billion dollars. Unfortunately, imports increased by over ten billion dollars
and the balance of trade widened.
R. FEINSCHREmER, TAX INCENTIVES FOR U.S. EXPORTs 16 (1975).
5. The desire by small producers to encourage exports was especially evident
in the 1976 revisions to the DISC legislation. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, § 1101, 90 Stat. 1520, 1655-60 (1976); see Comment, Evaluating
Recent Amendments to Domestic InternationalSales CorporationLegislation:
Has Congress Repaired a Slipped DISC?, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 480,
493 (1977).
6. Bittker and Eustice commented on the provisions' difficulty. "In keeping
with the high level of complexity one has come to expect as a matter of course in
the foreign tax area, the DISC provisions quickly reach, and rarely leave, a plateau of statutory intricacy seldom rivaled in other sections of the Code." J. BrnrKER & S. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERS 17-43 (4th ed. 1979). During hearings on the 1976 revisions, then Senator
Muskie remarked:
DISC adds undue complexity to the revenue laws. There is widespread
recognition that the tax law has been too complex. DISC is one of the
most striking examples of this trend. The statute and long implementing
regulations contain numerous complex rules, qualifications, and new concepts that must be carefully adhered to by companies seeking to use
DISC....
122 CONG. REC. S13764 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1976). See also BrrTKER & EUSTICE,
supra, at 17-49 ("intricate statutory minuet").
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porations will be examined in detail, with particular attention
paid to strategies for maximizing DISC benefits. In the final section, policy considerations will be considered in light of a conclusion: Despite the well-intentifned goals of DISC legislation, the
DISC concept has been developed in an overly detailed statute,
the complex wording of which threatens to obscure the whole
purpose of DISCs. That the DISC provisions' marginal impact on
reducing trade deficits is so small compared to the compliance
maze they create argues strongly for either their immediate repeal
or their drastic simplification. While the rules are in effect, however, tax managers of companies with significant income from exports are foolish not to gain tax advantages with DISCs.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In the years following World War H, the United States maintained a trade surplus as world trade expanded. Beginning in the
1970's, however, trade deficits began to appear.7 Congress was
aware of the United States' growing trade imbalance when it was
hammering out the Revenue Act of 1971,8 part of a multi-pronged
legislative effort to boost United States productivity and exports.
The DISC concept, embodied in sections 501-507 of the Act, was
a key element in this plan. The House version was "broadly similar" to the Treasury-sponsored Trade Act of 1970, 9 but was a
mechanism designed to defer tax not on 100 percent of export
income, but only on that export income in excess of a specified
base. 10 In conference, the incremental provision was removed, and
the plan ultimately provided for the current taxation of fifty percent of a DISC's export-related profit without reference to a base
period.1 There were strong objections that a DISC law without
7.

I PREsIENT's EXPORT CouNcIL, THE EXPORT hMERATIvE 13, 27 (1980)

(graphs at 27-28).

8. Pub. L. No. 97-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971); see H.R. REP. No. 533, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 4, reprintedin [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 1825, 1828. For an
edited version of the 1971 House, Senate, and House Conference Reports containing only those portions pertaining to DISCs, see FFJNScmBFnR, supra note
4, at 157-247.
9. The Trade Act (H.R. 18970) was passed by the House but not by the Senate. See H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 8, at 8, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1832.
10. Id.
11. CoNF. REP. No. 708 at 20, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2053, 2072.
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this type of incremental provision "had every likelihood of rewarding the large corporations presently engaged in exporting
without increasing our exports or helping small businesses to increase exports." 12 The Conference version became law. 13
DISCs were not the first attempt by Congress at granting tax
preferences to encourage export-related income. The precursors
of DISCs were the Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations
(WHTC), 4 which were designed to increase exports in the Western Hemisphere through a tax rate reduction (called a "deduction" under former I.R.C. section 922).15
The unfavorable United States balance of payments and trade
deficits in 1970 and 1971 were not the only reasons behind the
passage of the DISC legislation. In addition, the DISC concept
was promoted as equalizing two inequities faced by exporting domestic manufacturers. The first perceived inequality was that domestic manufacturers were disadvantaged vis-a-vis other United
States companies which produced and sold goods abroad through

12. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 8, at 91, [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1915 (dissenting views of Rep. Gibbons). For a discussion of the equities
of DISC hiw as originally passed, see Considine, The DISC Legislation: An
Evaluation, 7 N.Y.U.J. ILr'. L. & POL. 217, 219-22 (1974).
13. Pub. L. No. 92-178, §§ 501-507, 85 Stat. 497 (1971). In an unusual move,
the Treasury issued a "DISC Handbook" in 1972, which apparently was to be
used for guidance in operating DISCs until regulations could be promulgated.
Announcement 72-73, 1972-1 C.B. 24, reprinted in W. GIFFORD & W. STRENG,
INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING 34-56 (1979). It discusses the pre-1976 DISC legislation in remarkably clear prose compared with the regulations on DISCs
which ultimately came out.
14. Formerly in I.R.C. §§ 921-922, and before that, §§ 109, 119 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. WHTCs were repealed by the Tax Reform Act of
1976, and 1979 was the last possible tax year in which a company might receive
WHTC benefits. Because the first possible DISC tax year was 1972, the two
types of corporations existed side by side for eight years. There is extensive
literature, now outdated, comparing the tax benefits of the two. See F.mSCHREIBER, supra note 4, at 66-70; Feinschreiber, DISC versus WHTC-A Quantitative Comparison, 2 INT'L TAX J. 80 (1975); Llewellyn & Lewis, ForeignSales
Income: Tax Planning& Selection of the CorporateStructure, 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
228 (1976).
15. An exemption would have been an outright violation of the General
Agreement of Tariffs & Trade (GATT). Report of the GATT Working Party on
Subsidies of Nov. 19, 1960 (BISD, 9th Supp., Geneva, 1961). For the same reason, DISC tax sections allow deferral, not exemption. See Considine, supranote
12, at 225. See also Mills, DISC: Response to Trade-DistortingBorder Tax Adjustment under GATT, 31 TAx ExEcuTnvE 135 (1979).
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foreign subsidiaries, thus allowing them to defer tax on their foreign earnings on funds kept abroad."' The second inequality was
created by other major trading countries that effectively punish
imports and reward exports at their borders through value added
taxes. 17
Despite the need to reduce inequities in foreign tax law, and
despite the unprecedented eight billion dollar trade deficit confronting the United States in 1976,18 Congress succumbed to the
pressure of the "tax preference" critics and gutted the deferral
mechanism in the DISC legislation by enacting an "incremental
rule" similar to the one originally amended out of the House version of the 1971 Act." The main effect of the incremental rules
(aside from an exponential increase in the complexity of the
DISC operation) was to reward only increasesin export
sales and
'20
not export sales for which "no incentive is needed.
President Carter adamantly opposed DISCs as a corporate
loophole and tried to have the DISC Code sections repealed in
1978.21 Congress resisted repeal, and the provisions have not
changed since the 1976 amendments. 2 Meanwhile, the number of
DISCs continues to climb-12,192 as of February 1980, an eleven
percent increase over the number in February 1979.23 The Reagan
administration has not publicly indicated its position on DISCs.
It is difficult to predict whether the current Administration's gen16. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 8, at 58, [1971] U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD.

NEWS 1872.

17. Id.
18. I EXPORT IMPERATIVE, supra note 7, at 27.
19. For a discussion of the operation of the incremental rule, see text accompanying notes 43-45 infra; Table D infra. For the official "explanation of the
provisions" of the incremental rule, see Joint Committee Staff, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 at 291-300 (1976), reprinted in Gordon,
264-3d T.M., Domestic InternationalSales Corporations(DISC) at B-201 to B207 (1978). It is a fine example of what semanticists call "dead-level abstraction." See S. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT & ACTION 161-64 (3d ed. 1972).
20. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 264, reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3159; id. at 433, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3326
(supplemental views of Rep. Rostenkowski).
21. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL FOR TERMNATING DISC 274-76 (1978), reprinted in S. THOMPSON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF DOMESTIC & FOREIGN BusmNEss TRANSACTIONS at 588-89 (1980).
22. See Nauheim & Cass, U.S. Tax Proposals,1978-The End of Deferral &
DISC?, 78-3 TAx MGM'T INT'L J. 3, 14 (1978).
23.

(1980).

Green, Planning DISC Operations in the '80's, 6 INT'L TAX J. 373, 374
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eral pro-business attitude means DISCs will be maintained and
even strengthened, or whether the Administration's desire to
slash red tape means that DISCs will get the ax.24 Reagan's first
round of proposed tax cuts left DISCs unscathed.2 5
III. BASIC STRUCTURE AND OPERATION
This section explains the initial and ongoing requirements of
DISCs, illustrated by a hypothetical DISC operation. It is important to remember while wading through the requirements that a
DISC, like a Subchapter S corporation, is basically a conduit
through which non-deferred income flows back to the shareholders as either actual or constructive dividends, to be taxed at the
shareholder level. The DISC itself is exempt from all taxes, except the section 1491 tax on transfers to avoid income tax.2 6 The
main structural requirements of a DISC are contained in I.R.C.
section 992:
(1) A DISC must be incorporated in one of the fifty states or
the District of Columbia. It cannot be a tax-exempt organization, a personal holding company, a bank or savings and
loan, an insurance company, a mutual fund, a China Trade
Act corporation, or a Subchapter S corporation.
(2) A DISC needs only $2500 in equity capital, which may be
represented by only one class of shares.
(3) The shareholders (typically, one parent corporation)
must unanimously elect DISC status for the first taxable
year. Unlike the Subchapter S corporation election, the
DISC election need be made only once. Consent of later
shareholders is unnecessary.
27
(4) The adjusted basis of all "qualified export assets must
24. See note 6 supra.
25. See [1981] 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6155 (President Reagan's
tax cut proposals).
26. I.R.C. § 991.
27. Defined in I.R.C. § 993(b) to include:
(1) "export property" (itself defined in § 993(c); see note 31 infra);
(2) assets used primarily in connection with the sale, lease, rental, storage, handling, transportation, packaging, assembly, or servicing of export property;
(3) accounts receivable from producers;
(4) working capital;
(5) producer's loans (see note 67 infra);
(6) stock in a related FISC (see note 69 infra); and
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equal at least ninety-five percent of total assets.
(5) The DISC must have records separate from its parent's
(though the same computer system can generate both sets)
and its own bank account on each day of the taxable year.
This provision is necessary to the enforcement of DISC tax
law because the corporation itself exists largely on paper. 8
Although these rules are relatively straightforward, the slightest
deviation (such as not having a separate bank account on the last
day of a taxable year) can lead to disqualification; there is a "safe
harbor" means of complying with the ninety-five percent assets
test, however, that can save a "disqualified" DISC if the owners
are able to comply within eight and one-half months after the end
of the DISC's taxable year even if there is no good faith reason
29
for initially failing the test.
The three most salient operational requirements for DISCs are
the ninety-five percent gross receipts test, the allocation of income between parent and DISC, and the taxation of shareholders
on "deemed distributions." Each taxable year, at least ninety-five
percent of gross receipts must be "qualified export receipts," one
of many terms of art created by the DISC legislation, 0 which are
receipts resulting from the sale or lease of "export property."3 1

(7) miscellaneous Eximbank obligations.

28. See S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1971), reprinted in [1971]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2069.

29. I.R.C. § 992(c)(3).
30. I.R.C. § 993(a).
31. I.R.C. § 993(c). Briefly, "export property" includes property.
(a) manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in the United States by a non-

DISC person;
(b) held in the ordinary course of business primarily for sale, rental, or lease by
(or to) a DISC for direct use, consumption, or disposition abroad; and
c) not more than 50% of the fair market value of which is attributable to

imports.
Not surprisingly, this definition has been the subject of much litigation and
many Revenue Rulings. See GIFFORD & STRENG, supra note 13, at 59-67. One of
the most important yardsticks for "manufacturing" is the "20% rule" found in
Treas. Reg. § 1.993-3(c)(2)(iv), T.D. 7514 (1977), and enunciated in Rev. Rul. 75429, 1975-2 C.B. 312: "Property is manufactured.., by a person for the purposes of § 993(c) .. .if with respect to such property conversion costs (direct
labor.., including packaging or assembly) of such person account for 20 percent or more of the cost of goods sold. . .

."

Therefore, DISCs can add up to

20% in value to the goods without destroying their character as "export
property."
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Qualified export receipts also include interest on "producer
loans, ' ' 32 which are loans from a DISC to a producer for producing

export property. The two ninety-five percent rules virtually guarantee that a DISC will be a shell corporation created expressly for
tax purposes, as it is unlikely that an ongoing corporation would
intentionally meet these requirements. Because section 482 establishes arm's length attribution rules with which parent and subsidiary corporation doing international business must comply, the
allocation of income between producers and their DISCs is one of
the more remarkable provisions of the legislation, because it provides the only two safe harbors from the arm's length attribution
rules.3 3 The two safe harbor irules are known as the "four percent
rule" and the "fifty-fifty rule.

'3 4

These rules allow producers to

allocate to the DISC the higher of (a) four percent of qualified
export gross receipts or (b) fifty percent of the combined taxable
export income of the DISC and parent. If the DISC works on a
commission basis, as opposed to serving as an intermediary which
actually buys and resells the products, the percentages are based
on the producer's export gross receipts or taxable export income.3 5 No losses may be allocated by DISCs to their parents,36
although transactions may be grouped annually by product, by
product line, or even by transaction to maximize the benefits of
any one safe haven rule.37 Finally, no matter what safe haven
transfer pricing method is used, ten percent of all "export promotion expenses"38 are added to the DISC's taxable income.3 9
32.

I.R.C. § 993(d); see note 67 infra.

33. Allocation via § 482 may be used, however, if it provides the DISC with
more profit than either of the safe haven rules. I.R.C. § 994(a)(3); see Treas.
Reg. § 1.994-1(a) for the scope of intercompany pricing rules.
34. I.R.C. §§ 994(a)(1), 994 (a)(2).
35. See Treas. Reg. § 1.994-1, T.D. 7435 (1976).
36. Id. § 1.994-1(e)(1).
37. Id. § 1.994-1(c)(7); see Feinschreiber, Maximizing DISC Profits Through
QuantitativePricing Techniques, 2 INT'L TAX J. 28 (1975); text accompanying
notes 59-60 infra.
38. I.R.C. § 994(c). Here we find a good example of gratuitous regulation

permeating DISC legislation: export promotion expenses include one-half of
freight costs, but only if by sea or by air, and then only if shipped on United
States ships or airplanes, and then only if such shipping is not required by law
or regulations. On using export promotion expenses to boost the amount of

profit allocated to DISCs, see Feinschreiber, IncreasingDISC Benefits Through
Export Promotion Expenses, 3 IN'L TAX J. 371 (1977); Feinschreiber, supra

note 37, at 28-31.
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The teeth of the DISC deferral plan is the concept of constructive ("deemed") distribution. Because this provision ultimately
determines how much tax a DISC's shareholders pay, it has received more legislative attention than the other sections. The "incremental" revisions of 1976 took place here. (It is important to
remember throughout the following discussion that a DISC receives at most fifty percent of the export income from a producer's operations. Therefore, even before the incremental rule,
when a DISC was deemed to distribute fifty percent of its income
back to the producer, the DISC and producer as a unit were able
to defer tax on at most twenty-five percent of total export income. So, when percentages of DISC income are discussed, they
represent only half the income of the producer and DISC as an
economic unit.) For various policy reasons, there are eight types
of "deemed distributions" from a DISC to its shareholders each
4
taxable year:
(1) gross interest on producer's loans;
(2) gain on sale or exchange property other than "qualified
export property";
(3) gain on sale or exchange of any property with recapture
potential;
(4) one-half the taxable income from the sale of military
property;
(5) taxable income attributable to "base period export gross
receipts" (another term of art; non-incremental part of incremental rule; does not apply to "small" DISCs);41
(6) one-half the excess taxable income (before actual distributions) over the five categories above plus 100 percent of
any boycott income under I.R.C. section 999 and any bribes
or illegal payments;
(7) the dollar amount of foreign investments made with producer's loans from DISCs (note that this comes after all normal distributions-it is meant to discourage foreign investment by cutting directly into deferred income); and
39. I.R.C. §§ 994(a)(1), 994(a)(2). Section 994(b) also contains a provision for

marginal costing, which is beyond the scope of this Note. The interested reader
is referred to Treas. Reg. § 1.994-2.
40. This discussion is borrowed largely from [1981] 6 STmND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 4399R.03.
41.

See discussion in incremental rule at text accompanying notes 43-45

infra; Table D infra.
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(8) revocation distributions or distributions to meet the
ninety-five percent assets or income tests (these distributions
are extraordinary and normally would not be made each
year).

42

Though a working knowledge of the "incremental rule" is not essential to an understanding of this Note, the distributions described in (5) and (6) above demand a little more explanation:
A DISC's taxable income for the current year is ...

in effect di-

vided into two parts: one part, the nonincremental part, is equal to
taxable income attributable to adjusted [base period] export gross
receipts... ; and the other part, the incremental part, is the excess
of the current year's taxable income over the taxable income attributable to export gross receipts in the base period. The nonincremental part of the current year's taxable income is treated as a
deemed distribution from the DISC to its shareholders and is
taxed currently to them.... As to the remaining taxable income-the incremental part, one half is also deemed distributed
and taxed currently
to the shareholders, while tax on the other half
43
is deferred.

"Adjusted base period export gross receipts" is another new term
of art. It means sixty-seven percent of the average DISC's export
gross receipts for the four taxable years of the base period. 4" And
because the base period is set up as the fourth, fifth, sixth, and
seventh taxable years before any current taxable year,45 the DISC
is effectively put on a "treadmill": it must continually export
more than sixty-seven percent of the moving base period average
to get any deferred tax."
To bring these rules down to a more concrete level, they can be
applied to the hypothetical Calcutron corporation.
42. An odd (and punitive) quirk in this remedial distribution is that, if the

95% assets test (not income test) is not met at the end of the taxable year, the
fair market value of all "bad" assets, not just 95%, must be distributed. See
DISC: A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the [ABA] Section of Taxation-Midwinter Meeting-ColoradoSprings, Jan. 28, 1973, 26 TAx LAw. 537,

559 (1973).
43. Gourevitch, DISC's Ability to Defer Tax on Income Restricted by Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 46 J. TAXATION 9, 9 (1977).
44. I.R.C. § 995(e)(3).
45. I.R.C. § 995(e)(5)(b).
46. See Comment, supra note 5, at 480.
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Calcutron Facts
Calcutron, Inc., a California corporation located in "Silicon
Valley," uses electronic chips in producing two types of hand-held
calculators: (1) Minicalc, a small, cheap, four-function model; and
(2) Maxicalc, a larger, expensive, scientific calculator. Although
Calcutron sells equal dollar amounts of the two models, the profit
margins are four percent and sixteen percent respectively,
stronger competition for the Minicalc having kept prices low.
Calcutron manufactures the mechanical and electronic components, but imports the molded bodies and zippered vinyl pouches
from Taiwan. The bodies and pouches make up only twenty percent of the fair market value of the calculators. Calcutron also
adds ten percent in value in preparing the calculators for shipment. Although not required to do so by law, the company ships
its exported calculators only on United States carriers as a matter
of principle, even though they charge somewhat more than foreign carriers. Calcutron exports twenty-five percent of its calculators to Canada and twenty-five percent to Western Europe. It
maintains sales offices in leased space in Toronto and Munich,
each staffed by three salespeople.
DISCutron Facts
Calcutron, on advice of astute but slow-moving tax counsel,
formed a wholly-owned DISC named DISCutron, Inc. in 1973.
Calcutron complied with the basic formalities: $2,500 minimum
capitalization, separate bank accounts, one class of stock, and
proper election.47 Calcutron assigned DISCutron half its shipping
operations and the Montreal and Munich assets, which now constitute part of DISCutron's qualified export assets. DISCutron
can prepare the calculators for shipment without disqualifying as
a "manufacturing" operation because it adds less than twenty
percent to the fair market value of the calculators.48 Similarly, the
calculators qualify as "export property" even though they incorporate some imported parts, because the percentage of fair market value attributable to imports is only twenty percent, less than
the fifty percent allowed under I.R.C. section 993(c)(1)(C). 41 In
computing its export promotion expense, DISCutron can include
47.

See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.

48. Rev. Rul. 75-420, 1975-2 C.B. 312; see note 31 supra.
49.

See note 31 supra.
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not only the costs of the sales forces in Montreal and Munich, but
also half the shipping expenses (because they comply with the
rules of I.R.C. section 994(c)). 50
DISCutron's 1973 Tax Deferral
Based on the above information, DISCutron's deferral for 1973
would be computed as follows:
TABLE A: DISCUTRON'S 1973

PROFIT AND DEFERRED INcoME WITH

MUNICALC AND MAxIcALc GROUPED TOGETHER

(Data in 000's)
DISCutron Export Gross Receipts (EGR)
Less: DISCutron's Export Expenses
Less: Calcutron's Cost of Goods Sold
Less: Calcutron's Apportioned Expenses
Total Deductions
DISCutron Combined Taxable Income (CTI)
DISCutron's Profit under the 50% CTI Method
DISCutron's Profit under the 4% EGR Method
Maximum DISC Profit
Add: 10% Export Expenses
Total DISCutron Profit

$4,000
300
2,500
800
3,600
$ 400
200
160
200
30
$ 230

(this implies an intercompany price of $3,700 between Calcutron and
DISCutron.)
$ 115
Amount Deferrable (50% of Total DISCutron Profit)
Mathematically, the "four percent rule" for safe haven intercompany pricing yields higher DISC profit than the "fifty-fifty
rule" only when the DISC combined taxable income is less than
eight percent of the DISC export gross receipts. 1 Because Calcutron's average profit margin is ten percent, the "fifty-fifty rule"
50. See note 38 supra.
51. For example, if a producer has $100 in EGR and the total cost of produc-

tion is $94, that leaves $6 in CTI; it also represents a 6% profit margin. The
"50-50 rule" would allow only 50% of CTI, or $3 in deferred income, but the

"4% rule" would allow 4% of $100, or $4. If costs of production decrease to $90,
that leaves $10 in CTI and represents a 10% profit margin. The "50-50 rule"
would yield $5 in deferred income, but the "4% rule" would yield only $4.
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yields the higher DISC profit of the two safe haven rules-here,
$200,000 v. $160,000. Using $200,000 as the DISC profit, the addition of the $30,000 in export expenses yields $115,000 in deferrable income.
Because Calcutron's two product lines have widely varying
profitability-Minicalc at four percent and Maxicac at sixteen
percent-more profit may be squeezed into DISCutron by segregating the two product lines and choosing the more advantageous
safe haven rule for each one before adding in ten percent of export promotion expenses:
TABLE B: DISCUTRON'S 1973 PROFIT AND DEFERRED INCOME WITH
MINICALC AND MAXICALC SEGREGATED

(Data in 000's)

DISCutron EGR
Less: DISC Export Expenses

Less: Calcutron Cost of Goods Sold
Less: Calcutron Overhead
Total Deductions
DISCutron CTI

MINICALC
$2,000

MAXICALC
$2,000

150

150

1,370
400

1,130
400

DISCutron Profit-50% CTI Method
DISCutron Profit-4% EGR Method
Maximum DISC Profit
($80 from Minicale and $160 from Maxicalc)

1,920
$ 80

1,680
$ 320

40
80

160
80
$ 240

ADD: 10% Export Expenses (Total)

Total DISCutron Profit

30

$ 270

Segregating the two product lines caused the maximum DISC
profit to jump to $240,000. After export expenses of ten percent
were added into total DISC profit, DISCutron had $135,000 in
deferrable income. This represents an increase of seventeen percent from the income deferrable without segregation.
Table C below shows the hypothetical financial history of
Calcutron and DISCutron (1973-1981) based on the following
assumptions:

(1) Calcutron's gross receipts were $8,000,000 in 1973.
(2) Total gross receipts grow at $1,000,000 per year (note
that this implies a slower percentage growth each year,
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which is realistic for the years under consideration).
(3) DISCutron's gross receipts are always fifty percent of
Calcutron's-that is, Calcutron derives half its gross receipts
from exports.
(4) Calcutron's taxable income is always ten percent of its
gross receipts, and DISCutron's "combined taxable income"
is always ten percent of its export gross receipts. Its two
products, Minicalc and Maxicalc, sell in equal dollar
amounts yielding profits of four and sixteen percent
respectively.
(5) Because it segregates transactions by product, DISCutron's maximum profit using the four percent method for
Minicalc and the fifty-fifty method for Maxicalc is constant
at six percent of DISCutron's export gross receipts.
(6) Export promotion (selling) expense is constant at seven
and one-half percent of DISCutron's export gross receipts.
(7) For 1976-1979, the "base period" for computing the
deemed distribution from non-incremental sales is 1972-1975
(I.R.C. section 995(e)(5)(A)); for 1980, the base period is
1973-1976, and for 1981, the base period is 1974-1977 (I.R.C.
section 995(e)(5)(B)).
(8) DISCutron was formed January 1, 1973, and remained
qualified (that is, it passed the ninety-five percent assets and
gross receipts tests) every year through 1981.
The 1976 data can be used to show how the "incremental rule,"
added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, operates. The "base period" for DISC tax years 1976-1979 is made up of the years 19721975."' Because DISCutron was not formed until 1973, it had $0
in export gross receipts for 1972. DISCutron's "base period export
gross receipts" are therefore smaller than they would have been
had DISCutron been formed in 1972. The base is reduced even
further by a quirk in the statutory "adjustment" to base period
gross receipts-receipts for the period are divided by four, and
not simply averaged for the years in which the DISC had export
gross receipts. 53 Here is the 1976 deferral computation:

52.

I.R.C. § 995(e)(5)(A).

53. LR.C. § 995(e)(6).
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CALCULATING CALCUTRON'S 1976 INcomE DEFERRED WHEN
INCREMENTAL RULE Is IN EFFECT
(Data in 000's)

A. BACKGROUND DATA
Calcutron Gross Receipts
Calcutron Taxation Income
DISCutron EGR:

1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

DiSCutron 1976 CTI

$11,000
1,000
0
4,000
4,500
5,000
5,500
550
330

Maximum DISC Profit, Segregating Maxicalc and Minicalc

41

10% Export Promotion Expenses

371

Total DISCutron 1976 Income
B. COMPUTING ABPEGR
Adjusted Base Period Export Gross Receipts (ABPEGR)
67% x (EGR for 1976, 1973, 1974, and 1975) / 4
- 67% x (0 + 4,000 + 4,500 + 5,000) / 4
- 2,261

C. COMPUTING DISTRIBUTION FROM INCREMENTAL RULE
Deemed Distribution for Non-Incremental EGR
- Total DISC Profit x ABPEGR
1976 EGR
= 371 x 2,261
5,500
= 153

D. REGULAR DEEMED DISTRIBUTION
50% Deemed Distribution from Incremental EGR
50% x (Total DISC Profit-Deemed Distribution from Non-Incremental EGR)
- 50% x (371-153)
- 109

E. DEFERRED INCOME
Total DISCutron Profit
Less: Distribution, Non-Incremental
Less: Distribution, 50% Incremental
Deferred Income*

371
153
109

262
109

*(The income itself is not deferred; the tax on it (46%, or $50) is deferred.)
F. DEFERRED INCOME AS PERCENTAGES
Deferred Income as % of 1976 DSCutron Total Incomed
Deferred Income as % of 1976 Calcutron Taxable Income

29%
10%
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Had the "incremental rule" not been in effect, Calcutron's 1976
deferred income would have been $186,000. The actual deferral of
$109,000 represents a forty-one percent decrease. As the last column in Table C shows, deferred income as a percent of Calcutron
taxable income dropped from seventeen percent in 1975 to ten
percent in 1976. During 1977-1979, the percentage inched up
slightly to eleven percent, but declined again in 1980-1981 once
the base period started to include later taxable years.
The preceding examples described how a DISC is started and
operated. But what happens when a DISC is terminated or disqualifies? This is another aspect of a DISC that resembles a Subchapter S corporation. The DISC maintains three accounts:
"accumulated DISC income," the undistributed, tax deferred income; "previously taxed income," the undistributed income already deemed distributed and taxed to shareholders; and "other
earnings and profits," accumulated in years when the corporation
was not a DISC." If a DISC election is revoked or terminated
automatically (which happens if the DISC fails to qualify in each
of five consecutive tax years), any actual distributions come first
out of "previously taxed income" tax-free. "Accumulated DISC
income" is not taxed to shareholders all at once, but is deemed
distributed in equal amounts over the shorter of ten years or
twice the number of years the DISC had qualified. 5 DISCutron
qualified for at least five years, so if it disqualified after 1981, its
"accumulated DISC income" of $1,291,000 would be taxed to
Calcutron at $129,100 per year for ten years.
DISC stock is not likely to be traded freely, but it can be disposed of through sale or at death of the shareholder. If DISC
stock is sold at a gain, the shareholder is immediately taxed at
ordinary rates on his share of DISC income accumulated during
the time that shareholder held the stock.56 The transferee may
still have his "accumulated DISC income" spread out, however.
Through a quirk in estate tax sections, no gain or loss is recog54. BiTTKER & EUSTICE, supranote 6, at 17-49; see [1981] 6 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) 4339R.01.
55. I.R.C. § 995(b)(2)(B). Before the 1976 amendments, the "distributions
upon disqualification" were spread out over the lesser of ten years or the number (not twice the number) of "immediately preceding consecutive taxable years
during which the corporation was a DISC." This aspect of DISC distributions

gives rise to an important planning strategy. See text accompanying note 66
infra.
56. I.R.C. § 995(c)(2).
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nized when DISC (or former DISC) stock is transferred by reason
of the shareholder's death. Although the effect on DISC stock of
the I.R.C. section 1023 carryover rules is unclear,"57 the transferee
may also get a stepped-up basis. This has obvious estate planning
advantages for individual DISC shareholders.
I.R.C. section 995(c), which controls recapture of DISC income
on disposition of DISC stock, covers treatment of gain in two situations: sale at a gain and disposition on DISC termination. In
each case, gain is treated as dividend income to the extent of the
shareholder's pro rata share of "accumulated DISC income." Astute authors have pointed out 8 that, unlike I.R.C. section 1245,
I.R.C. section 995(c) does not override the provisions of section
337 and 302. Such strategies leading to permanent deferral of tax
on "accumulated DISC income" present intriguing possibilities,
but are beyond the scope of this Note. Most of the avoidance is
made possible by the fact that a DISC shareholder is not responsible for "accumulated DISC income" accumulated when he was
not holding the stock.
IV.

SELECTED PROVISIONS PRESENTING STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES

Whether or not the DISC provisions do what they set out to do,
they are likely to be with us for at least a few more years, and any
phase out would probably occur over a span of years rather than
months. It is therefore important to note some special aspects of
the DISC rules that present the tax planner with hidden but substantial opportunities for maximizing benefits, despite the retrenchment of the incremental rule. Because some of these aspects require extensive mathematical proofs, these descriptions
are cited to sources that provide detailed explanations and
calculations.
Judicious grouping of the transactions before applying the safe
haven intercompany transfer pricing rules is the first technique
by which more profits can be squeezed into DISCs, thereby increasing deferred taxes.59 Though the possibilities for increasing
profit through segregation and grouping are far more complex
than the DISCutron example, the segregation of DISCutron's two
product lines, shown above in Table B, provides a simple example
57. Gordon, supra note 19, at A-38.
58. Fisher, Kohl, & Knox IV, With ProperPlanning,Deferred OrdinaryIncome of a DISC Need Never Be Recaptured, 40 J. TAXATION 138 (1974).
59. The best source on this topic is Feinscreiber, supra note 37.
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of this technique. Mathematically, profit allotted to a DISC
reaches a local maximum at four percent; therefore, products,
product lines, or transactions should be grouped so that their
profit margins are neither more nor less than four percent.60
It is obvious from the way the safe harbor rules are set up that
export promotion expenses can be a source of extra DISC income.
The rules here are unusually picky, however, and should be followed to the letter."1
Several elements of the incremental rule present profit maximizing opportunities. The first is the "small DISC" exception,"2
which eliminates the deemed distribution based on adjusted base
period export gross receipts for DISCs with less than $100,000 in
adjusted taxable export income, and phases it in on a two-for-one
basis for DISCs with adjusted taxable income from $100,000 to
$150,000. There may therefore be cases when DISC income
should be intentionally limited to $100,000, especially for large
but unprofitable or declining DISCs. 3 Producers with "accumulated DISC income" greater than $150,000 should not, however,
form multiple DISCs in the hope of spreading the income among
them and exempting them from the incremental rule. The Internal Revenue Service has already thought of this, and I.R.C. section 995(e)(10) provides
for the combining of tax attributes of
6
brother-sister DISCs.
A second silk purse can be made from the incremental rule's
ears because of the seven years it takes for a new DISC to develop
a full four-year base period. A DISC has no base period export
gross receipts until its fifth taxable year, and then any base pe60. Feinschreiber classifies transactions by profit margin: Class A if greater

than or equal to 8% (use 50-50 method if ungrouped); Class B if greater than
4% but less than 8% (use 4% method if ungrouped); Class C if less than 4%

but still profitable (use 4% method subject to no loss rule if ungrouped); and
Class D if unprofitable (exclude from DISC unless grouped with other transactions or priced under § 482). Id. at 34-35. He then generates examples to develop
strategies for grouping classes of transactions to maximize DISC income. Id. at

37-55.
61.
62.

See Feinschreiber, supra note 38.
I.R.C. § 995(f).

63. See R. FEiNSCHREIBER, INTERNATIONAL TAX PLANNING TODAY 118-25
(1977).
64. For a thorough discussion of the three anti-avoidance rules in I.R.C.
§ 995(e)(8)-(10), see Gourevitch, supra note 43, at 10-11. See also General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, supra note 19, at B-203 to B-205 in
Gordon.
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riod total is divided by four (rather than arithmetically averaged)
before the sixty-seven percent rule is applied. So if a DISC grows
even moderately over its first eight years, the incremental rule
will have less than its full effect. For DISCutron, the first year in
which there was a four-year base period was 1980. In that year,
"adjusted base period export gross receipts" jumped forty-one
percent, and deferrable income dropped nine percent, even
though export gross receipts had increased $500,000 (see Table
C). Of course, this puts new or growing DISCs at an advantage
over older, stagnating ones.6 5 For example, if Calcutron's export
sales had remained flat at $4,000,000 for the years 1973-1981,
DISCutron could have deferred only $767,000 in income over that
time-less than sixty percent of the $1,291,000 it was able to defer with sales growing at decreasing rates.
A final strategic benefit linked to the incremental rule is gained
from the long span of time over which "accumulated DISC income" trickles in after disqualification of the DISC. For example,
if a DISC disqualifies in year six, deemed distributions are spread
equally over years seven to sixteen. This means that a producer
not only should try to qualify its DISC for at least five years to
get the maximum benefit of the rule, but should also consider establishing a nominal DISC at the same time it begins its main
one. Then, should the main DISC disqualify, assets could be
transferred to the nominal DISC to keep the clock running to
deferral purposes. 6
Miscellaneous strategic plamning possibilities exist apart from
the transfer pricing and incremental rules. One is the use of a
"commission" DISC rather than a "buy-sell" DISC, which actually takes title to all goods exported. A commission DISC offers
several savings: no employees are required, fewer records are required, and customers need never know the DISC exists. In addition, if the DISC buys its accounts receivable, rather than taking
loans from the producer, producers acquire the DISC's tax-deferred money in a more profitable manner. Producer's loans are
so restricted that the red tape may not be worth the effort, 67 and
65. See Comment, supra note 5, at 482; Henning & Kretzer, DISC & the '76
Act, 9 TAx ADVISER 324, 329 (1978).
66. See FEINSCHREMER, supra note 62, at 157-59.
67. Treas. Reg. § 1.993-4 contains the Byzantine rules controlling producer's
loans. Basically, a "producer's loan" is a loan by a DISC out of its "accumulated

DISC income" to a producer (not necessarily its parent). It must be evidenced
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having the DISC buy accounts receivable avoids the complexity of
the "wash" transaction that interest payments generate.0 8 Yet another trick is to defer tax on deemed distributions an extra eleven
months by having the DISC's taxable year end one month after
its parent's taxable year. Finally, a DISC with a need for a foreign
sales office can make use of a Foreign International Sales Corporation (FISC) to augment its income and increase its deferral,
particularly if the FISC is located in a tax haven country.8 9
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In the introduction, it was suggested that trade deficits were
the main reason for DISC legislation. Despite the one-dimension70
ality of this view, it is sometimes cited as a sufficient reason.
Actually, many other economic factors were considered, 1 though
most were related to the United States balance of trade and balance of payments deficits. 72 There was also concern about the exporting of jobs,/ 5 but the main concern was with relative tax inequities. Before DISC, domestic exporters faced five tax
disadvantages:
(1) United States tax was deferred on foreign subsidiaries'
income, but not on income from foreign sales by domestic
corporations;
(2) GATT and the value-added tax structure in other countries allowed them to tax imports but exempt exports, dis-

by a note with an appropriate legend; it may not have a maturity of more than

five years; it may not be used for foreign investment (if it is, the portion in-

vested becomes a deemed distribution; see text accompanying notes 42 supra).

In fact, it can be used only to expand the producer's export assets for research
and development. See Norman, The Use of Producer'sLoans to Increase DISC
Benefits, 1 INT'L TAX J. 201 (1975).
68. DISC: A Panel Discussion, supra note 42, at 549.

69. I.R.C. § 993(e). A discussion of FISCs is beyond the scope of this Note.
For more information, see FEINSCHREIBER, supra note 62, at 138-42; Feinschreiber, FISC: The Foreign International Sales Corporation,1 INT'L TAX J.
214 (1975); Feinschreiber, How to Double DISC Benefits Through FISC &
Grouping, 6 INT'L TAX J. 367 (1980).
70. See E. OWENS & G.

BALL,

THE INDImEcT CRFarr 374 n.1 (1975); 1 R.

§ 4.41[1] (1973).
71. See generally S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in
[1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1978.
72. FEINSCHREMER, supra note 4, at 14.
73. DISC: A Panel Discussion, supra note 42, at 538.
RHOADES, INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN RELATED TRANSACTIONS
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advantaging foreign exports;
(3) foreign states promoted their domestic exports through
accelerated depreciation and large write-offs for export promotion expenses;

(4) foreign states were more lenient than the United States
in allowing exporters to retain profits in tax haven countries

through relaxed intercompany pricing; and
(5) the limited tax haven devices under United States law
mainly benefitted large corporations, putting smaller exporters at a competitive disadvantage. 4
Whether or not the legislators who passed the 1971 and 1976 tax
acts were aware of each of these inequities, the DISC legislation

as it evolved has responded in part to each of them.
But this begs the question. Given the United States' balance of
payments problems, is a change in tax policy the most effective or

equitable way to "correct" the imbalance? As with most economic
phenomena, opinions on this issue vary. If a majority of the members of Congress from 1971 to the present did not perceive the

DISC program as being either effective or equitable, it would not
have lasted. But commentators are split.7 5 Not surprisingly, Rob-

ert Feinschreiber, the most published expert on DISCs, 76 thinks
they have been a benefit.77 :President Carter's Export Council
even recommended strengthening DISCs.7 8 But the econometric

data remain inconclusive, and another commentator, William
Considine, has cast serious doubt on both the premises and the
74. Considine, supra note 12, at. 218-19. See also J. BiscHEL & R. FEmI(1977).
75. Some sources provide only qualified praise. See Comment, supra note 5,
at 494 ("The 1976 reforms appear to have made the DISC more efficient, more
SCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 108-09

effective, and more equitable ....
[T]he 1976 amendments are sufficiently wellconceived to justify cautious optimism regarding [DISC's] continuing utility.").
76. At last count, Feinschreiber has published nineteen articles and three
books discussing DISCs. For a partial bibliography, see FEINSCHRMER, supra
note 62, at 377-79.
77. See FEINSCHREIEER, supra note 4, at 16: "In 1972, the first year DISC was
in effect, exports from the United States made their largest increase ever in dollar terms, . . ." Cf. Considine, supra note 12, at 222 ("Exports were not the
weak part of our payments balance. Domestic exports rose 40% from 1967 to
1971." (Footnote omitted)).
78. I PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 98-99 ("DISC provides
working capital to exporters to finance the longer-term accounts receivable that
are usual with customers in foreign countries, and DISC also provides funds to
encourage risky long-term market development in new foreign growth areas.").
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results of the DISC provisions.7 9 Considine was not the first to
question the basic premise of using tax law to effect this particular economic end, 0 but his main points are so cogent that they
bear listing:
(1) It is fallacious to expect DISCs to increase domestic employment, because employment is more a factor of monetary
and fiscal policy. A tax expenditure is therefore no better
than other possible expenditures.
(2) To correct a balance of payments deficit, the classical solution is to devalue the currency. Although the President's
reluctance to do so may have been a boost to DISC's passage,
the dollar was devalued by more than seventeen percent anyway, only eight days after the DISC legislation passed. It is
statistically impossible to attribute the surge in exports in
1972 to DISC operations alone for this very reason.8 1
(3) DISC creates its own inequity, favoring those producers
which export over those which sell domestically.
(4) Small business is less likely to use a complex procedure
because the paperwork may be too expensive relative to its
benefits for a small enterprise.8 2
(5) Most large exporters decide to export or invest abroad
largely for non-tax reasons. Therefore, they will treat the
DISC legislation as a windfall, not as an incentive.
(6) DISCs save only one percent of export receipts on average (from tax deferral). If costs equal ninety percent of receipts, then even a three percent difference in costs would
swamp any DISC benefits.
(7) DISC helps those who have and hurts those who have

79. Considine, supra note 12.
80.

See REPORT

OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BusINESs TAXATION 43

(1970); Hearings on the Trade Act of 1970 Before the House Committee on
Ways & Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2611 (1970); Hearings on the Revenue Act
of 1971 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 631, 720,
724, 741 (1971).

81. See note 75 supra.
82. Considine also cites an economic study showing the remarkable resistance small producers exhibited to exporting even with massive personal assistance and information. Piper, How U.S. Firms Evaluate Foreign Investment

Opportunities,19 MICH. ST. U. Bus. ToPics 11 (1971). And with the legal and
accounting costs of setting up a DISC ranging from $2,500 to $15,000 in 1972,
small businesses would be even less interested. Bus. WEEK, July 29, 1972, at 30.
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not.8 3 And the same firms which get more than half of export

receipts account for eighty percent of United States investments abroad-so any inequity between foreign subsidiaries
and domestic subsidiaries which export is illusory."
Surprisingly, Considine appears to be the only commentator to
have used both pure and applied economics to evaluate the DISC
provisions. His damning findings, when compared with the more
usual vague allusions to efficiency and equity based on gross numerical data, convincingly argue that DISC probably never has
done what it set out to do-increase exports and employment
while reducing perceived tax inequities.
The DISC provisions could hardly be more convoluted. Even
accepting the premise that international income tax law is bound
to be more complex than domestic income tax law, the basic operation of Domestic International Sales Corporations is well beyond
the grasp of the small exporter the statute was purportedly
designed to benefit. With the incremental rule in full effect, a
small exporter can defer tax on only ten percent of its taxable
income (see the last columns of Table C, above). With marginal
corporate tax rates at forty-six percent, the small exporter can
use or invest about four and one-half percent more than it would
normally be able to invest, and part if not all of these savings are
eaten up by the ongoing legal and accounting fees related to
DISC operations. Though the savings can still be significant for
big exports, the small exporter is probably better off looking for
ways to cut costs, raise profit margins, or hedge on future swings
in dollar valuations in the commodities markets than to attempt
to use DISCs.
If export promotion is a goal, DISC legislation is not the optimal use of tax law to achieve this goal. The fear of "windfalls to
current exporters that led to the diabolical "incremental rule" implies that some exports are better than others. If this is true, the
incremental rule should be amended once again, so that one hundred percent, and not just sixty-seven percent, of base period export receipts are used to increase deemed distributions, and
83. In the Seventh Annual Report on DISCs issued by the Treasury in 1980
(for tax years ending between July 1977 and July 1978), the 31 largest DISCs,

less than .3% of the total number, generated more than half the total DISC
income. Green, supra note 23, at 376.

84. These points were distilled form the whole of Considine's article. Footnotes supporting his claims have been omitted. Considine, supra note 12.
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deferral is limited to income generated by truly incremental sales.
A more direct deemed distribution rule would require a DISC to
subtract last year's receipts from this year's receipts, and then
distribute fifty percent of the remainder.
Simplification of the DISC provisions so that small exporters
comprehend and are motivated by such provisions risks more
"windfalls" to current exporters. If Congress is not willing to face
that risk and make the DISC program more accessible, it should
pull the plug on DISC, let the deferred income seep back into the
tax base, and focus on non-tax measures that would increase exports, such as spending cuts, budget balancing, or regulatory
reform.
In the meantime, many more corporations could be taking advantage of DISCs. The sluggish domestic economy is forcing more
and more companies to look across United States borders at foreign markets. Forming DISCs to funnel foreign sales can reduce
the costs of penetrating new markets. What DISCs provide is the
benefit of time: income ultimately comes home to roost (and to be
taxed), but during the deferral period, producers can use money
that would otherwise be taxed away. With short-term interest
rates recently peaking at over twenty percent, the time value of
income deferral has increased dramatically. For example, if DISCutron's $1,291,000 in deferred income goes back to Calcutron
over ten years, Calcutron could earn $2,370,000 in interest at
twenty percent.
DISCs' high incorporation and operational expenses militate
for the formation of one DISC by several small exporters. A commission DISC would work best in this context because it would
require less paperwork than a buy-sell DISC. Shareholders would
then get DISC benefits proportionate to their interests. Alternatively, a small exporter might be able to buy shares in an older,
established DISC that may have declining sales and problems
meeting its assets tests.
Though DISC provisions are unarguably complex, the tax benefits they provide are undeniably substantial. Tax managers in exporting corporations of whatever size need to be made aware of
the benefits so that they can evaluate whether the marginal benefits of DISC exceed its marginal costs.
GarrisonR. Cox

